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Winter 2004

REMARKS AT THE INVESTITURE
OF ERIC M. FREEDMAN AS THE MAURICE A.
DEANE DISTINGUISHED PROFESSOR OF
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, NOVEMBER 22, 2004
Anthony G. Amsterdam*
A convocation to inaugurate a new distinguished professorship of
constitutional law naturally invites reflections on the question whether
the current state of United States constitutional law makes it worth
professing. Of course, such an occasion also stacks the deck against a
negative answer. It would be ingratitude of the worst sort for me to
accept the law school's hospitality, eat the cheese and drink the wine
promised at the end of our speech-making, and devote my speech to
declaring that the distinction conferred upon my esteemed colleague and
good friend, Eric Freedman, is a wrongheaded venture from the get-go.
So I will not take it that far. But I will assert that a significant part
of constitutional law as it is doctrinally understood and taught in law
schools today is as dead as Davie Crockett's beaver hat and that it is
amazing that we go on understanding it and teaching it and writing about
it in the way we do. I refer to the Bill of Rights and the guarantees of due
process and equal protection that are supposed to safeguard the rights of
criminal defendants and of persons suspected of doing or plotting violent
criminal misdeeds.

*

University Professor and Professor of Law, New York University School of Law.
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My point is not simply that the constitutional rights of criminal
defendants and suspects are being widely disregarded, violated without
redress as a matter of routine practice, and amputated even at the level of
rights-definition by invasive judicial interpretations and hostile
legislative incursions. Those criticisms are trite.
My point is far more basic. It is that in criminal cases generally we
have seen an end of the rights-based concept of justice that is supposed
to be the genius of Anglo-American law. That concept says that
individuals enjoy a body of legal rights protected by fundamental law.
The rights are prescribed and defined by legal rules. The rules are
elaborated and applied by courts, are collected and analyzed and
explained in lawbooks (including codes and digests and treatises and law
reviews) and are taught in law school courses. When the rights are found
to have been violated or disregarded, a remedy prescribed by law is
forthcoming. As the ancient maxim has it, "ubi jus, ubi remedium,"
where there's a right there's a remedy. As the old, characteristically
sexist slogan expresses it, we have a government of laws, not men. The
laws prescribe our entitlements and our liberties and our immunities,
including the ways in which government is supposed to treat each of us.
And if we are treated in a way that violates these laws, there is a
secondary body of laws that prescribes the appropriate redress.
Isn't that the way you learned constitutional law? I learned it that
way. In the United States, courts interpret and enforce the Constitution.
When a party presents a claim of constitutional right to a court, the basic
mode of constitutional analysis to be conducted is familiar. One asks,
first, does the constitutional claimant indeed have the constitutional right
that s/he claims? If so, one asks, second, has that right been violated by
the conduct s/he complains of, or would it be violated if the entitlement
s/he asserts is not recognized? If so, one asks, finally, what remedy the
law provides to redress or avert that violation?
This is still the way courts write opinions. It is still the way digests
collect the law and the way treatises and learned legal publications
explicate and analyze the law. It is still the way law school casebooks
are organized and, for the most part, it is the way law school courses are
taught. If you don't dig it and do it this way, you will not pass your law
school exams and you will continue to retake the bar exam repeatedly
until you learn to do it this way.
But anyone who practices real constitutional law in real courts in
real criminal cases knows that this entire model of law is an antiquated
brain-wrap, mustier than Davie Crockett's coonskin. Harbor no illusions
on that score. The central historical fact of contemporary American

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol33/iss2/1

2

Amsterdam: Remarks at the Investiture of Eric M. Freedman as the Maurice A.
2004]

INVESTITURE OFERIC M FREEDMAN

405

constitutional jurisprudence is that, at least in criminal cases, the rightbased conception of law is defunct. Obsolete. Otiose. No matter how
much legal rules and legal rights are still talked about by courts, arrayed
in digests, and studied in law schools, nowadays (with very rare
exceptions) judges simply do not give a damn about what the
constitutional rights of criminal defendants are or whether they have
been violated. Judges parse the rules defining a defendant's
constitutional rights more or less closely, more or less strictly, and more
or less honestly, in order to grant or deny relief, depending upon whether
they do or do not believe that the defendant suffered some outrageous
injustice that is way out of proportion to the probability that he or she
deserves to be punished either for committing some ugly crime or for
being a vicious, worthless slimebag, or both.
I am not talking about lawless, maverick judges. I am talking about
something more systemic and far more radical. We are seeing a
degeneration of the very idea of constitutional rights. The blindfold that
Justice is supposed to wear as she weighs competing rights and
obligations with indifference to the outcome has been shredded. Now, as
a matter of judicial methodology, judges are supposed to peep through
the blindfold, survey the outcomes which their rulings would produce,
and tip the scales in such a way as to avoid unwelcome outcomes.
What evidence can I offer to support this assertion? It is all around
us, but I will limit my case to three illustrative bodies of rules that
control decision-making in a wide array of criminal cases.
1. The first body of rules goes under the general name of harmless
error. Assume that you are convicted of a crime after a trial at which
your coerced confession was admitted into evidence against you or the
prosecutor insinuated to your jury that your failure to take the witness
stand and testify on your own behalf means you're guilty. In either of
these cases, your constitutional privilege against self-incrimination has
plainly and indisputably been violated. Do you get a new trial? Not
necessarily, or even ordinarily. Doctrines of "harmless error" originally
created by courts to avoid appellate reversals of convictions for truly
trivial and technical failures to observe arcane procedural formalities
have now evolved into a broad blanket rule upholding convictions
whenever appellate judges conclude that even the most obvious and
indefensible violations of basic constitutional guarantees didn't make a
difference in the outcome of the trial.1 In theory, the standard by which
1. "[M]ost constitutional errors can be harmless." Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306
(1991) (opinion of Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court on this point); accord Neder v.
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appellate courts are supposed to test the harmlessness of most
constitutional errors in the pretrial process and at trial is whether the
judges are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not
contribute to the guilty verdict or the sentence. 2 But in practice, it much
more often boils down to whether the appellate judges think that the
prosecution's evidence of guilt was potent and the sentence well
deserved.3
One reason why the standard gets watered down in practice is that
harmless-error analysis is seldom written up in appellate opinions in a
way that forces the authoring judge, or his or her concurring colleagues,
or any higher appellate court, or any concerned constituency-even the
law reviews or the scholarly community-to examine it critically. When
appellate judges decide to reject a claim of error on harmless-error
grounds, they very often do not say anything at all about the claim in
their opinion. When they do say that the claim has been considered and
rejected on harmless-error grounds, their explanation for why they
regard any possible error as harmless is ordinarily brief and unrevealing,
often conclusionary, almost always immune to criticism or review
because it is case-specific and therefore opaque to anyone not
thoroughly familiar with the record of the particular case.
These kinds of opaque rulings represent the fate of most claims of
constitutional right made to appellate courts in criminal cases. Judges
deciding criminal appeals reject five or six claims of constitutional error
on harmless-error grounds for every one that they adjudicate on the
merits.
2. But harmless-error analysis is only one aspect and symptom of a
more pervasive trend toward result-oriented jurisprudence in
constitutional criminal law. Increasingly, courts are developing the very
United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 (1999); see, e.g., Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12 (2003) (per curiam);
Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986); United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499 (1983).
2. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
3. See, e.g., Gutierrez v. McGinnis, 389 F.3d 300 (2d Cir. 2004) (state appellate court rejects
federal Confrontation Clause claim on grounds of harmless error where the prosecution's case was
"overwhelming"; federal court of appeals in habeas corpus proceedings holds that this state-court

ruling is not unreasonable under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) [see note 27 infra and accompanying text]);
United States v. Bowens, 108 Fed. Appx. 945 (5th Cir. 2004) (violation of the Sixth Amendment
right to present defensive evidence was harmless because of the prosecution's "overwhelming
evidence of guilt"); United States v. Moiseev, 108 Fed. Appx. 500 (9th Cir. 2004) (assuming that
Confrontation Clause and Brady violations cumulatively impaired the defendant's ability to
impeach a prosecution witness, the errors were harmless because "any reasonable jury could still
have concluded that the weight of evidence was sufficient to find Moiseev guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt ... [and the] harmless error doctrine 'requires us to affirm a conviction if there is
overwhelming evidence of guilt."').
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substantive rules that define constitutional rights in such a way as to
make some requirement of harmful effect a precondition to finding a
constitutional violation.
A classic example of this is the Brady doctrine 4 defining a
prosecutor's constitutional obligation to disclose exculpatory or
impeaching information to the defense. To make out a Brady violation,
the defense must show that the undisclosed information was "material,"
and the test of materiality is whether there is a reasonable probability
that disclosure of the information would have made a difference in the
outcome of the trial. 5
A similar rule is increasingly being used to define the defendant's
rights of access to defense evidence or witnesses when such access is
impeded by various forms of governmental action, ranging from the
deportation of potential witnesses to the denial of continuances
necessary to enable the defense to secure a witness's attendance at trial.
In all of these situations, courts are incorporating a "prejudice"
dimension into the rules that define a defendant's rights.6 Prejudice in
the sense of a demonstrable effect on the outcome of the trial is being
made a necessary ingredient of any judicial finding that a defendant has
the constitutional right s/he claims.
Lately, courts have begun to develop similar rules with regard to an
indigent defendant's entitlement to state funds for expert witnesses,
investigative services, and other defense resources under Ake v.
Oklahoma.7 I had a conference recently with a judge who plainly
thought that Ake was spelled "ache." Constitutional law is becoming so
result-oriented, so concerned with guesswork about outcomes that it is
devolving into one big "Ouch" test. No showing of "Ouch," no finding
of constitutional violation.
Another cardinal example of this development is the federal Sixth
Amendment law of ineffective assistance of counsel. That law is
currently dominated by the so-called "two-pronged" rule of Stricklandv.
Washington.8 In order to make out ineffective assistance of defense
counsel at trial or on appeal, a criminal defendant must show both that
counsel's performance was below minimum standards of competency

4. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
5. E.g., Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 289-96 (1999); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419,
433-34 (1995); United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985).
6.

See, e.g., United States v. Valenzuela-Bemal, 458 U.S. 858 (1982).

7. 470 U.S. 68 (1985). See, e.g., Conklin v. Schofield, 366 F.3d 1191 (5th Cir. 2004).
8. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
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and that this substandard performance prejudiced the defendant.9 The
test of prejudice under Strickland, as under Brady, is whether there is a
reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial or sentencing
proceeding would have been different but for counsel's substandard
performance.10
This was bad enough to start with. I remember reading the
Strickland opinion the day it came down and saying to myself that it
upended all the constitutional law I had ever learned. The Strickland
Court's explicit reasoning was that the purpose of the right to counsel
was to assure criminal defendants a fair trial. Therefore, unless courtappointed counsel's performance is so bad that the whole trial is
rendered unfair, there can be no violation of the right to counsel." I had
always thought that Gideon v. Wainwrightt 2 incorporated the Sixth
Amendment into the Fourteenth, but apparently I had that backward.
According to Strickland it is the Fourteenth Amendment's right to a fair
trial that gets incorporated into the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
And the test of fairness is judicial satisfaction with the outcome. So if
reviewing judges are comfortable that a defendant is guilty and deserved
the sentence he got, his lawyer's failure to come near meeting the
minimum standards of professional performance doesn't violate the
Sixth Amendment guarantee of the right to the assistance of counsel for
one's defense. Again, no "Ouch," no constitutional rights violation.
There used to be other tests for ineffective assistance than
Strickland. One was the so-called Cronic test' 3 under which a violation
of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel could be found in some
circumstances without a showing of prejudice. Another was a
specialized rule relaxing the showing of prejudice in cases where
counsel had a conflict of interest.14 1 will spare you the details, which are
fast becoming of merely antiquarian interest. Because in a series of cases
over the past four years, the Supreme Court has made clear its intent to
retract the sphere of each of these rules, expand the sphere of Strickland
proportionately, and demand some sort of showing of prejudice as a

9.
10.
11.

See id. at 687-700.
See id. at 694-95.
See id. at 687, 691-92, 696.

12.

372 U.S. 335 (1963).

13. United State v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984). See, e.g., Geders v. United States, 425 U.S.
80 (1976); Burdine v. Johnson, 262 F.3d 336 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom.,
Cockrell v. Burdine, 535 U.S. 1120 (2002).
14. See, e.g., Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980); Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261 (1981).
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precondition of finding ineffective assistance of counsel in virtually
every imaginable situation."
3. As a third and last example of the trend in constitutional law to
replace a rights-based jurisprudence with one that is result-oriented,
consider the array of rules dealing with post-appeal remedies-or what
are more commonly called postconviction remedies-in criminal cases.
After a forty-year period of expansion that was contemporaneous with
the growth of modem-day constitutional criminal procedure rights, the
Supreme Court in the late 1970s began to cut back sharply on the
availability of federal habeas corpus remedies for persons convicted at
state trials in which their federal constitutional rights had been
violated.' 6 In 1996, swept by a wave of fury in the wake of the
Oklahoma City bombing, Congress enacted the so-called Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act, 17 building on issue preclusion and
review-curbing ideas that the Court had initiated and ratcheting them up
so as to make federal habeas relief for constitutional violations still more
difficult to obtain. State courts and state legislatures commonly flocked
to follow the U.S. Supreme Court's and Congress's lead, restricting state
court postconviction remedies for constitutional violations in a similar
manner.
I won't try to summarize the new body of rules governing
postconviction procedure for you. They are intricately labyrinthine, and
so confusing that courts today devote ten times as much labor,
intelligence, and prose to deciding whether they can hear a convicted
person's constitutional claims at all as they devote to considering the
merits of such claims.' 8 1 will focus on several key features of the rules.
First, postconviction remedies are restricted by standards of
harmless error that allow even more violations of constitutional rights to
go unredressed than the harmless error rules applied on appeal. In
postconviction proceedings, constitutional violations are deemed
harmless and disregarded unless they are found to have "had a

15. Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000); Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162 (2002); Bell
v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685 (2002); Florida v. Nixon, 125 S. Ct. 551 (2004).
16. See, e.g., Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 (1982);
McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991) (dealing with second or successive federal habeas
petitions).

17. Pub. L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996). See, e.g., 1 RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S.LIEBMAN,
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 109-215 (4th ed. 2001); Larry W. Yackle, A
Primeron the New Habeas Corpus Statute, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 381 (1996).
18. See, e.g., Jordan Steiker, RestructuringPost-Conviction Review of FederalConstitutional
Claims by State Prisoners: Confronting the New Face of Excessive Proceduralism, 1998 U. CHI.
LEGAL FORUM 315.
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"substantial and injurious effect or influence" in bringing about the
conviction or sentence 1 9 This is a standard which, in practical effect,
leads postconviction judges to dismiss almost all claims of constitutional
error in trial and sentencing proceedings by saying that the prosecution
had a powerful case and therefore nothing else that happened at trial or
on appeal matters. 20
Second, the rules of postconviction procedure operate in such a way
as to magnify the significance of the Strickland standard for ineffective
assistance of counsel that I mentioned earlier. This is so because
postconviction remedies are necessary primarily in cases where a
criminal defendant's claims or the facts necessary to support them were
not properly presented at trial or on appeal. What the postconviction
rules elaborated by the U.S. Supreme Court since the 1980s-and then
expanded by Congress and adopted by most state courts-have done is
to say that unless a criminal defendant's lawyer was ineffective by
Strickland standards, any constitutional claims that the lawyer could
have presented but failed to present satisfactorily at trial or on appeal
cannot be entertained in postconviction proceedings, with very rare
exceptions. 21 This makes Strickland's result-oriented "prejudice"

19. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623, 637-38 (1993).
20. See, e.g., Richmond v. Polk, 375 F.3d 309, 335 (4th Cir. 2004) (constitutional error in
failing to instruct the jury that the defendant would be ineligible for parole if sentenced to life
imprisonment instead of death was harmless because the defendant committed grisly murders of his
best friend's ex-wife and her two children after raping her and then hypocritically served as a
pallbearer at their funerals); Hopkins v. Cockrell, 325 F.3d 579 (5th Cir. 2003) ("[E]ven if this
Court were to exclude those portions of the confession that were obtained involuntarily, Hopkins'
conviction must be affirmed if the error was harmless.... In order to grant federal habeas relief, the
trial error must have a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.
Brecht .... In light of the overwhelming amount of circumstantial evidence present in this case, we
hold that any error in admitting Hopkins' confession was harmless."); Hicks v. Collins, 384 F.3d
204 (6th Cir. 2004) (assuming that the prosecutor's comments in closing argument were so
prejudicial as to violate the defendant's right to due process, they were harmless "since the evidence
of... guilt was overwhelming"); Morales v. Woodford, 388 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2004) ("Applying
the Brecht standard, we conclude, after thorough study of the record 'as a whole,' that the
instructional error regarding the torture special circumstance did not have a 'substantial and
injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.' The state's testimonial and physical
evidence implicating Morales was overwhelming. There was no conflicting evidence regarding
whether Morales murdered Terri Winchell, why he murdered her, or how he murdered her. And it
was an entirely gratuitous and terribly vicious murder."); Leavitt v. Arave, 383 F.3d 809 (9th Cir.
2004) (jury instruction shifting burden to the defendant to produce evidence supporting his alibi
defense was harmless under the Brecht standard because "[i]t is inconceivable that any reasonable
juror would have bought his alibi in these circumstances. Besides, the evidence overall was
overwhelming.").
21. See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 745-57 (1991); Dugger v, Adams, 489
U.S. 401 (1989); Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527 (1986).
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component the key to postconviction remedies in almost all criminal
cases.
Third, the rare exceptions to this rule precluding postconviction
relief for constitutional violations are themselves articulated in ways that
depend on result-oriented inquiries. Most of the exceptions involve
doctrines that go by the shorthand name of "cause and prejudice. 2 2 The
prejudice component of the doctrines is, as its name implies, still another
device for telling judges to decline to entertain constitutional claims
unless they are convinced that a criminal conviction was undeserved
because of the defendant's likely innocence. Subdoctrines under the
23
cause and prejudice doctrine go by names like "miscarriage of justice
and "actual innocence. 24 And what the caselaw expounding these
subdoctrines shows is that the courts today believe that the only
miscarriage of criminal justice is the conviction of somebody who was
neither involved in any way in the crime-a victim of mistaken
identity-nor the least bit blameworthy for living in a life style that
made him apprehendable under the suspicious circumstances giving rise
to his mistaken identification. 21 "Actual innocence," in turn, means that
to secure postconviction relief a convicted person must demonstrate to
judges both that his or her constitutional rights were violated in the
criminal process and that he or she is really not guilty by a standard that
can only be described as the squeaky clean test.
Congress has endorsed these doctrines in the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act, providing that, in various situations, federal
habeas corpus relief is not available to persons whose constitutional
rights were violated in the state criminal process unless these persons
show "by clear and convincing evidence that[,] but for [the]
constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found...
[them] guilty of the underlying offense. 26 And Congress went further. It
also provided that if a state court has rejected a criminal defendant's
claim of federal constitutional error on the merits, federal habeas corpus

22. E.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 745-51 (1991); McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S.
467, 493-503 (1991); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90-91 (1977); see 2 HERTZ & LIEBMAN,
supra note 17, at 1192-1227.
23. E.g., Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495-96 (1986); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 135
(1982); see HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 17, at 1227-40.
24. E.g., Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995); Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333 (1992);
Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986); see HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 17, at 1227-40
25. See, e.g., Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538 (1998); House v. Bell, 386 F.3d 668 (6th
Cir. 2004); Sistrunk v. Armenakis, 292 F.3d 669 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc).
26. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(B); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii) (dealing with second or
successive federal habeas petitions).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2004

9

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 2 [2004], Art. 1
HOFSTRA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 33:403

relief cannot be granted to that defendant upon a finding that the state
court's decision was erroneous as a matter of federal constitutional law.
Federal habeas relief can be granted only if the state court's decision
involves an "unreasonable application" of federal constitutional law-an
application so strained that it cannot be regarded as within the bounds of
reason. 27 You see how far this procedure deviates from the notion that
criminal defendants enjoy a body of rights guaranteed by the
Constitution and that, when those rights are violated, there will be
redress for the violation. Federal habeas corpus courts no longer decide
cases of alleged violations of federal constitutional rights in the state
criminal process by looking to the rules of constitutional law and asking
whether those rules confer a constitutional right upon the defendant that
was violated by the way in which he or she was treated by the state
courts. Nowadays they ask only whether any errors that the state courts
may have committed in rejecting a defendant's federal constitutional
claims were outside the range of honest bungling or were close enough
to it for government work.
Finally, the U.S. Supreme Court invented a rule, subsequently
adopted and made more strict by Congress,2 8 that has to do with a
convicted defendant's ability to claim the benefit of changes in the
interpretation of constitutional rights that result from judicial decisions
handed down after his or her conviction. This is the rule of Teague v.
Lane,29 saying that new developments in constitutional doctrine which
expand defendants' rights cannot be invoked in federal habeas corpus
proceedings by a defendant whose conviction became final before those
developments occurred. Conversely, if constitutional developments
retract defendants' rights after a particular defendant's conviction
became final, the government can invoke those developments to defeat
the defendant's federal habeas claim that his or her rights were violated
under the law of the Constitution as it existed at the time of his or her
trial and appeal. 30 To give a defendant the benefit of obsolete
constitutional rights would be, the Court insists, a costly, illegitimate
windfall. To deny the government the benefit of obsolete limitations
upon constitutional rights would be, by contrast, a costly betrayal of

27. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). See Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652 (2004); Lockyer v.
Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-77 (2003); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 409-13 (2000) (opinion of
Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court on this point).
28. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
29. 489 U.S. 288 (1989). See, e.g., Beard v. Banks, 124 S. Ct. 2504 (2004); Gray v.
Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 166-70 (1996); Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407 (1990).
30. Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 371-73 (1993).
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prosecutors' and courts' legitimate expectations of legal stability, that
mainstay of the social order. If you find these propositions puzzling,
even contradictory, I can only advise you to read Justice O'Connor's
Teague opinion with an eye to its unarticulated assumptions about the
origins and evolution of the legal universe. According to those
assumptions, prosecutor-friendly rules of criminal procedure are the
products of the natural order, predating human intervention and
possessing an enduring quality of rightness that survives any
modification human agencies may later make in them. The Supreme
Court does occasionally replace those natural rules with others that are
more defendant-friendly, but these latter rules are the artificial, quirky
products of unpredictable human tinkering and have no authority
transcending the transitory will of their manufacturers. 3 1 The two kinds
of rules seem to have an ontological relationship somewhat like that of
good cholesterol and bad cholesterol. Obviously, the courts can do no
wrong in seeking to alleviate the untoward results of their occasional
indulgences in bad cholesterol.
Okay. So what does all of this tell us about the current status of
constitutional law in criminal matters? It tells us:
First, that the doctrinal rules defining the constitutional rights
supposedly conferred by the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution of the United States and their state
constitutional parallels are of very little consequence in the actual
adjudication of claims of constitutional violations by reviewing courts in
the criminal process. They are of somewhat more consequence in the
original trial court. But, ironically, trial judges tend to be relatively
uncritical believers in black-letter, hornbook law and neither know nor
care much about the sophisticated analyses of constitutional rights and
rules that ceaselessly preoccupy scholars and teachers of constitutional
law. And, of course, many trial judges-particularly those who must run
for office in contested elections-are result-oriented and legally
disoriented for reasons that are blowing in political winds no academic
study of constitutional law can inform or withstand.
Second, the doctrinal rules that do tend to be of great consequence
in the actual adjudication of claims of constitutional violations by
reviewing courts in the criminal process are for the most part vacuous
platitudes like the rule defining "prejudice" for purposes of adjudicating
ineffective assistance of counsel claims under Strickland, or the rule
defining "materiality" for the purpose of adjudicating prosecutorial
31.
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nondisclosure claims under Brady, or the rules defining "harmless error"
on appeal or "cause and prejudice" in federal habeas corpus practice.
These are largely rules offering no substantive complexity that is worth
studying or teaching anywhere but in a bar review cram course, and
offering no more guidance to judges deciding cases than a valentine card
in the traditional shape offers to surgeons performing heart transplants.
Such rules do nothing more or less than direct judges to make factcentered, case-specific judgments, usually about the strength or
weakness of the prosecution's evidence of guilt or of the ugliness of the
crime for purposes of sentencing enhancement.
Finally, it is these fact-centered case-specific judgments that govern
the disposition of almost all constitutional issues in almost all criminal
cases decided by appellate and postconviction courts. And judgments of
this sort are almost wholly immune from analysis or governance in terms
of the sorts of legal rules that we ordinarily think of, and write about,
and teach, as comprising the substance of constitutional law.
Does this suggest that constitutional law is unworthy of study or
teaching? No, although it does suggest that much of the focus of what
the legal academy thinks about and writes about and teaches on the
subject of constitutional law relating to the criminal process is of little
practical importance, as distinguished from aesthetic interest or utility as
the apparatus for mental muscle-building through intellectual
gymnastics.
If constitutional scholarship and teaching are to have some greater
influence on the actual administration of the criminal law, what
directions might they take? That question leads me, not surprisingly, to
three of the major emphases of the constitutional scholar and teacher
who is being invested today as the inaugural Maurice A. Deane
Distinguished Professor of Constitutional Law, Eric Freedman.
First, constitutional teaching and scholarship need to be more
concerned with historical studies, particularly, detailed studies of the
ways in which our legal institutions have evolved in troubled times. We
are not the first generation in American history-or in English history
before it-that has had its heritage of legal rights subverted by intensely
felt needs to accommodate concerns about public safety and assuage
fears of insecurity by suspending safeguards that-looking back and
then forward in calmer times-we recognize as necessary to protect
individual freedoms and restrain governmental powers in the ways
envisioned by our basic ideals of constitutional democracy. Yet time and
again we have rediscovered the capacity to demand that our courts and
public officials respect those ideals and pay them better homage than lip

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol33/iss2/1

12

Amsterdam: Remarks at the Investiture of Eric M. Freedman as the Maurice A.
2004]

INVESTITURE OF ERIC M FREEDMAN

service. Meticulous historical study of our lapses and recoveries can give
us the understanding that we need of why we so often lose efficient faith
in fundamental freedoms and how we can recover it. This is the sort of
work that Eric Freedman has done with singular distinction and that
makes his investiture as the first occupant of an important constitutional
chair especially appropriate.
Second, constitutional scholarship and exposition can be set to the
task of public education. In an era when the media exercises enormous
power to mold popular opinion and also has considerable direct
influence on the weight that judges give to contending values and
concerns, a vital role for constitutional scholars is to design and
implement means for making our historic commitments to individual
liberty and fairness and equality understandable in the forums of public
discourse. Eric Freedman has been at the forefront of the growing
number of serious constitutional scholars who also take this
responsibility seriously. His sophisticated grasp of the way the media
functions and his systematic cultivation of opportunities and methods for
translating our most fundamental legal principles into popularly accepted
values have made a pioneering contribution to the work that
constitutional law must perform if it is to play an effective part in
regulating the operations of practical government.
Third, constitutional scholars must attend to developing
international perspectives on the issues with which the United States
Constitution and state constitutions are concerned. Isolationist thinking
bred of the comfortable, cocky myth of American exceptionalism has
largely obscured for us the fact that the Framers of our Constitution
meant it to enshrine the most enlightened and progressive ideals of the
community of nations. If the dumb fiasco of the lawless mass detention
of suspected terrorist operatives at Guantanamo Bay by the current
administration has had any positive consequence at all, it is that the
world-wide outcry of repugnance for this cowboy adventure into
totalitarianism has reminded us that other nations around the globe have
much to teach us about respect for liberty and its protection by the rule
of law. In exposing the injustices and oppressions of Guantanamo to the
censure of the world and in bringing the world's censure to the attention
of the United States Supreme Court in the Guantanamo litigation
brought to end these injustices and oppressions, Eric Freedman has once
again played a prominent and pioneering role.
For these reasons among others, I suggest that Eric's installation as
a Distinguished Professor of Constitutional Law should be for all of us
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an occasion of extraordinary pride in a time when we have lamentably
few other reasons to be justifiably proud of ourselves.
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